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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an Appeal from an Order by the Honor-
able Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff, 
as widow and beneficiary, sued Defendant insur-
ance company under group insurance policies is-
sued by Defendant to the deceased' s employer, 
Ajax Press Company, 'Nlth two death benefit certi-
ficates, a medical benefit certificate and a weekly 
indemnity certificaJe issued to deceased. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO\f\lER COURT 
The case being at issue, at pretrial the Court 
directed that certain issues as to one policy, the 
$800.00 policy, be disposed of by Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and continued the pretrial (Pretriai 
Order paragraph 7 R 42). Plaintiff, in accordance 
with leave of Court at pretrial, amended the Com-
plaint asserting two other policies, the weekly in-
demnity policy and the medical benefits policy and 
submitted interrogatories which were never re· 
sponded to. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the 
amended Complaint was granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the Complaint reinstated 
for further proceedings in accordance with the pre-
trial order, including disposition of the legal ques-
tion poised with reference to the $800.00 policy (No. 
5311848), further discovery regarding amounts pro-
vided under the $1500.00 policy (No. 0486A), and de-
tails of benefits under the other two policies, and 
thereafter trial of the issues then remaining. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Decedant, Leland E. Bench, died July 1, 1963 
after being terminated of his employment April 2G. 
1963 by employer, Ajax Press Company. Plaintiff. 
the deceased' s widow, claims benefits under certain 
life, weekly indemnity and medical benefit groun 
insurance policies written by Defendant company. 
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Plaintiff claims that decedent was totally disabled 
from date of termination until date of death, a condi-
tion under one of the policies, and that Defendant 
denied liability and refused to disclose certain of 
the policies thereby waiving notice and proofs of 
loss. 
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges generally the exist-
ance of insurance covering her husband's death and 
the refusal of the Defendant to pay thereunder; De-
fendant's Answer admitted two policies, an $800.00 
policy No. 5311848 and a $1500.00 policy No. 0486A 
and omitted reference to a policy, Certificate No. 
0486W ref erred to by pretrial order and Certificate 
No. 0846-H mentioned for the first time in the Amend-
ed Complaint. 
As to the two policies admitted, Defendant's 
original Answer to the original Complaint admitted 
that Plaintiff was beneficiary, denied liability on the 
$800.00 policy because of clause excluding payment 
where death occurred over thirty-one days from 
termination of employment and denied liability on 
the $1500.00 policy because of alleged failure of 
Plaintiff to submit Proof of Death within a year and 
Proof of Disability from date of termination until date 
of death. 
Interrogatories disclosed notice by Plaintiff to 
Defendant "within a week after the death of Mr. 
Bench." (R 28) 
The record is silent as to details of Defendant's 
denial of liability, as to Plaintiff's fulfillment of con-
ditions precedent, as to facts supporting the alleged 
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estopple, and the nature of benefits under policies 
No. 0486-W and No. 0846-H. 
The case being at issue was pretried by Hon-
orable Joseph G. Jeppson, the Pre-trial Order detail-
ing that as to the $800.00 po1icy, the effect of its pro-
visions where death occurred more than thirty-days 
after termination of employment should be as a_ 
matter of law determined by Motion for Summary 
Judgment. and that as to the $1500.00 policy, a pro-
vision for replacement brouqht to light at pretrial 
lent doubt as to the amount recoverable in the event 
of coverage and that the replaced policy should be 
furnished by Defendant. 
As to the $1500.00 policy, it was encumbent in 
the original Complaint, the Answer thereto, and th0 
pretrial order that the only thing to be decided 
thereon was first, whether Proof of Death was sub-
mitted or necessity thereof waived by denial of lia-
bility and second, whether deceased was totally 
disabled from the date of termination until death. 
Also at pretrial Plaintiff was given leave to 
amend to assert liability under certificate No. 
0486-W a medical benefits policy not theretofore 
disclosed by the pleadings, and the pretrial was 
continued, the Court saying: 
"The pertrial is continued without date, and may be 
renoticed without going to the foot of the pretrial 
back-log of cases." (R 42) 
By Amended Complaint Plaintiff asserted the 
three referred to policies, First Cause of Action, the 
$800.00 policy No. 5311848; Second Cause of Action, 
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the $1500.00 policy No. 0486-A; Third Cause of Ac-
tion, the weekly benefits policy No. 0486-W; 
Fourth Cause of Action, policy No. 0846-H, a medical 
benefits policy; and Fifth Cause of Action assert-
]ng any other policies. 
The Amended Complaint also asserted de-
ceased' s total disability from termil1ation of employ-
ment until death, a. reauisite under the $1500.00 
policy No. 0486-A, due and required notice under 
all of the policies, fulfillment of all conditions prece-
dent, and estopple of Defendant to claim time, 
notice, and other defenses. 
The record does not, and should have been 
made to reveal details of Defendant's denial of pay-
ment; also of facts supporting Plaintiff's allegation 
of estopple of Defendant to claim policy defenses 
and we may assume that Plaintiff's Interrogatories 
in the record (R 64), never answered, inquiring as 
to Ajax Press officials authorized to act for De-
fendant company, Interrogatory No. 3, 4, and 9 and 
with respect to visits by Plaintiff by Ajax Press per-
sonnel concerning insurance benefits, Interrogatory 
No. 11, had these interrogatories been answered, 
may have supplied particulars that adherence to 
the record precludes the writer from commenting 
upon. 
Defendant moved (R 69) the Court to dismiss 
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserting 
failure of same to state a cause of action and citinq 
Rule 12, the Answers to Interrogatories, the Depo-
sition of Plaintiff and the Affidavit of Larry Blake. 
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The District Court granted the Motion to Dismis2 
without detailing why nor whether the legcl isstic· 
on the $800.00 policy, directed to be disposed of by 
the pretrial order, was specifically ruled on or only 
incidentally disposed of by the catch-all Dismisso.l 
Order. Neither does the Dismissal Order indicate 
how the case, as to the $1500.00 policy, deemed at 
issue at pretrial, met vrith dismissal summarily. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING PRE-
TRIAL ORDER. 
As to the $800.00 policy No. 5311848, the same 
contains this clause (R 17): 
"The insurance upon the life of any employee shall 
automatically cease upon the thirty-first day follow-
ing the termination of his employment with the em-
ployer in the specified classes of employees; but in 
the case of the termination of the employment for 
any reason whatsoever while insured under said 
policy, the employee shall be entitled to have issued 
to him by the society, without further evidence of 
insurability, upon application made to the society 
within thirty-one days after such termination and 
upon the payment of the premium applicable to the 
class of risk to which he belongs and to the form 
and amount of the policy at his then attained age, an 
individual policy of life insurance in any one of the 
forms then customarily issued by the society, except 
term insurance, in an amount equal to, or at his 
option, less than the amount of his protection under 
the group insurance policy at the time of such 
termination. Such individual insurance policy shall 
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become effective at the end of thirty-one days after 
the termination of the employment provided the 
premium therefor is paid to the society not later than 
such effective date." 
Noting the legal question thereby raised, the 
Pre-trial Judge (R 41) directed that same be disposed 
of by Motion for Summary Judgment. However, 
after Plaintiff amended the Complaint as allowed by 
the Pre-trial Order, Defendant moved to dismiss and 
the record does not reveal whether the question 
was specifically considered or only incidentally 
disposed of by the Court in granting the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
In connection with this $800.00 policy, num-
erous cases hold that one whose employment has 
terminated and who dies or becomes disabled with-
in the grace period, is protected, although the pol-
icy provides that the insurance shall cease upon the 
termination of the employment. 
In Powell -vs- Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
173 S.C. 50, 174 S.E. 649, it was held where a de-
ceased woman employee had been insured under 
a group insurance policy providing for termination 
of employment, except that the employer could elect 
to consider employees temporarily laid off or tempo-
rarily disabled as still employed during such a pe-
riod, and granting a grace period of thirty-one days 
for the payment of the premiums, during which 
period the policy was to continue in force, and it 
appeared that although the employee was laid off 
because of her physical condition on December 10, 
1931, the termination date of her insurance was 
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filled in on the employer's insurance register as of 
February 1, 1932 and that she died on February 
27th the same year without having returned to work, 
that even though her insurance was terminated 
February 1st, she still had insurance protection un-
der the grace provision of the policy and that the 
trial Court committed no error in leaving to the jury 
the question of employment and in refusing the in-
surer's motion for non-suit and direction of verdict. 
In Equitable Life Assurance Society vs. Hoover. 
187 Okla. 134, 101 Pac. 2nd 632, the Court held in 
such a policy that the term "grace period" apparent-
ly meant period of continuance under a conversion 
clause. There the policy provided for termination 0£ 
insurance on termination of employment and thirty-
one days to convert and the Court held that the in-
surance did not terminate until the end of the thirty-
one day grace period although there was, in fact, 
in that case, no conversion. 
In the instant case there is no thirty-one day 
grace period to convert; the actual policy is in force 
for thirty-one days; therefore a reasonable time 
should be allowed for conversion after the thirty-
one day grace period. Decedant died thirty-five days 
after the end of the thirty-one day termination pe-
riod. 
In Atlas vs. Miles, 161 Pac 2nd 1022, it was held 
that a group policy terminable on termination of em-
ployment and thirty-one days conversion period did 
not terminate despite the fact of no conversion untll 
after the thirty-one day grace period so that there 
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was coverage where the insured terminated Novem-
ber 10th and died December 6th. 
In Shanks vs. Travelers Insurance Company. 
Okla. 25 F Supp. 740, a deceased employee was cov-
ered by a group policy and although he had not 
exercised his conversion privilege, good for thirty-
one days, and died the day following termination, 
it was held the deceased was covered by insurance 
even though he had not exercised his conversion 
privilege. 
In the instant case it can be inferred that de-
cedent, had he not been disabled, would have ex-
ercised conversion privilege; also that he may have 
done so had he been notified or been made knowl-
edgeable of the privilege and also that he had 
reasonable time after termination of the policy 
which, in turn, terminated thirty-one days following 
termination of employment. 
In Steiner vs. Travelers Insurance Company. 
279 Ill. App. 607, a group insurance policy provided 
that coverage thereunder terminated with termina-
tion of employment but that temporary layoff or 
leave of absence should not be considered as ter-
mination unless the employer should so elect; the 
employee died six weeks after he was laid off and 
while the contract with the employee was in full 
force and effect, it was held that the incontestible 
provision in the policy imposed on the insurer the 
burden of proving that the employment of the de-
ceased had terminated within the provisions of the 
policy. 
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In the instant case, the Plaintiff came (R 66) 
paragraph 6, that decedant was terminated for the 
same disability which resulted in his death and 
from Defendant's Affidavit (R 57) we are led to be-
lieve that termination at best, if not according to 
Plaintiff's Complaint, was because decedent told 
Larry Blake "Go to hell." 
Full discovery not having been completed, the 
facts may well disclose decedant was improperly 
terminated and that the burden that was as in the 1 
Illinois case on the Defendant to prove that the em-
ployment of the deceased employee had terminated 
within the provisions of the policy. 
Travelers Insurance Company vs. Fox. 155 Md. 
210, 141 Atl. 547 held that where liability under a 
group policy such as this was claimed because 0£ , 
termination, the burden of proving the discharge 
was on the insurance company. 
Peters vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 27<) 
Mich. 663, 273 N.\/\1. 307 holds categorically that the 
burden of proof in a policy such as this, where th'? 
policy has lapsed by reason of termination of the 
employee's employment, is on the insurance com-
pany. 
In the instant case the Plaintiff alleges that, and 
apparently feels that she can prove that insured 
was disabled durinq the period in which he was en-
titled to apply for a converted policy. If so, recovery 
in the instant case on the $800.00 policy would un-
doubtedly be allovved in Oklahoma or Illinois and, 
in accordance with the pretrial order of the Cowt 
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here the Court should have specifically decided 
what the la.w is in Utah. 
With respect to the $1500.00 policy, No. 0486-A, 
the cause was, at pretrial, at issue with only two 
questions to be decided: the adequacy of proof to 
the company or waiver of necessity of same, and 
secondly, whether the deceased was disabled from 
date of termination until date of death, the policy 
providing (R-19) that is disability continues from 
date of termination until date of death "There shall 
be paid to such employee's beneficiary under said 
policy the amount of insurance in force thereunder 
on the life of such employee at said date ... " 
The fact that the Court at pretrial (R-41) allowed 
Plaintiff further discovery as to the amount recov-
erable under the $1500.00 policy, No. 0486-A, did not 
change the fact that the case was already at issue 
with respect to said policy and the Court's dismissal 
of the case as to that policy, along with the $800.00 
policy on vvhich there was difficult issues of law, 
came as a complete surprise to Plaintiff. 
It is the usual ruling that denial of liability by 
an insurance company waives necessity of formal 
proofs of loss, 22 ALR, 407, Wilkerson vs. Standard 
Accident Insurance Company, 180 Calif. 252, 180 
Pac. 607. Plaintiff was entitled to assume in view of 
the pretrial order that the cause of action as to the 
$1500.00 policy was already at issue and that she 
need not spell out in detail the denial of liability, 
the party denying liability in behalf of the insur-
ance company, the nature of notice given of death 
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as set forth in Response to Interrogatories, (R-22) o"-
the detail as to performance of conditions precedent 
to Plaintiff's demands and to Defendant's liability a3 
alleged in the Second Amended Complaint {R-66) 
or to support the estopple alleged in paragraph 10, 
{R-67). 
Regarding denial of liability as a waiver of 
proofs, 29 A Am. Jur. reads as follows: 
Article 1431. Denial of Liability-A denial of liability 
of an insurer, made during the period prescribed by 
the policy for the presentation of proofs, and on 
grounds not relating to the proofs, will ordinarily be 
considered a waiver of the provision of the policy re-
quiring the proofs to be presented, or a waiver of the 
insufficiency of the proofs or of defects therein. The 
denial of liability is equivalent to declaration that 
the insurer will not pay although proofs are furnished 
in accordance with the policy, and the law will not 
require the doing of a vain or useless thing. 
The Am. Jur. text cites Stewart vs. Commercial 
Insurance Company. 114 Utah 278, 198 Pac. 2nd 467, 
a casualty loss case where the foregoing principles 
are recited, the head note reading: 
"Denial of liability by insurance carrier made, dur-
ing period prescribed by policy for presentation of 
proof or loss, on grounds not relating to proofs wi.ll 
ordinarily be considered waiver of provisions of policy 
requiring proofs to be presented." 
The foregoing Utah Casualty loss case in turn 
cites Miller vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 
84 Utah 533, 37 Pac. 2nd 547, a life insurance case, 
where the Utah Supreme Court, page 549 said: 
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" on the facts found by the jury's verdict, the 
company waived further information and formal 
proof by reason of its denial of liability and failure 
to furnish blank forms." Federal Life Insurance Com-
pany vs. Lewis, 76 Olka. 142, 183 Pac. 975, 5 ALR 
1637. The rule supported by the weight of authority 
is thus stated in 14 RCL 1349: " 'If the insurer re-
fuses to furnish blanks on the grounds that no liabil-
ity exists, it waives proofs of loss. Where it is custom-
ary for the insurer to furnish blanks for proof of loss, 
its refusal to do so upon request is a waiver of proof.'" 
Had the Interrogatories (R-64) been answered, 
the record may well have been made to reveal the 
details of notice and denial of liability and the 
Jdentity and authority of persons receiving such 
notice and their authority in acting for the company 
in denying liability. 
POINT II 
THE COMPLAINT, CONTRARY TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER, STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
As to the medical and weekly benefit policies, 
Nos. 0486-W and 0846-H, set forth in the third and 
fourth causes of action, the general allegations in 
the Amended Complaint apply, i.e., coverage, 
notice, rights as beneficiary, compliance by Plaint-
iff with conditions precedent and estopple to claim 
la_ck of notice etc. 
There being no requirement, as for instance 
with fraud, for Pleiintiff to particularize in pleading, 
a cause of action is stated and in the absence of a 
demand, or a requirement by the Court, that Plaint-
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iff particularize on those elements, it is difficult ~rJ 
see why the Compla.int was dismissed. 
We are brought to the third point and an in-
quiry as to whether evidentia.ry matters disclosed 
in the record warrant dismissal in the nature of ct 
Summary Judgment. 
POINT III 
EVIDENTIARY MATTERS IN THE RECORD DO 
NOT SUSTAIN DISMISSAL. 
Evidentiary matters in the record consist of the 
following: Insurance policies produced (R-12, 13, 
43, 44), Affidavit of Larry Blake (R-56), Answering 
Affidavit of Plaintiff (R-58), Response to Interrogct-
tories (R-27 and 28) and the Deposition of Plaintiff. 
No aid, of course, is given on the $800.00 policy 
question, that being a matter of law. 
As to the $1500.00 policy, No. 0486-A remem-
bering there are two questions, submission of Proof 
of Death within a year and the matter of total dis-
ability from termination of employment until death, 
let us examine the evidence for aid. The Interroga-
tories (R-28) give no aid except the answer that noti-
fication of claim was within one week after the 
death of Mr. Bench and this aids Plaintiff-not de-
fendant. 
The $1500.00 policy on exhibit of course spells 
out the requirement of disability from termination 
until death. The deposition makes amply clear that 
deceased was totally disabled from termination until 
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death. A few quotations indicate how positive the 
testimony is on this: 
(Deposition of Plaintiff. page 8, L 24.) 
Q. So he stayed right in bed from the date he was 
terminated until he went out to the County 
hospital? 
A. Except when he went for a treatment. 
(Deposition page 8, L 19.) 
Q. And between April 26th and the date he went 
to the County Hospital was he confined to bed 
or was he up and around? 
A. He had to go to bed and have his feet elevated, 
his leg. 
Q. Both legs or only one? 
A. Just the one. 
(Deposition page 8, L 25.) 
Q. During this period of time, what did your hus-
band do while he was at home? Was he in bed 
all of the time? 
A. He would lie around in bed or on the couch. The 
doctor told him to stay off it. 
(Deposition p. 11, L 30.) 
Q. What was the appearance of it? Was it an open 
wound? 
A. It was kind of open wound with stuff all around 
it with red streaks up his leg and down. 
Q. Didn't it appear to improve any with these treat-
ments? 
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A. It didn't seem like it was improving as good as 
it should. 
Q. You mentioned that he went in the hospital on 
the Thursday before July 1st. 
A. Yes. 
Q. He was admitted at that time as a bed patient? 
Was he in the hospital? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And didn't ever leave the hospital? 
A. No, not until after death. 
(Deposition p. 17, L 9.) 
Q. During the period between April 26 and the 
Thursday before July 1st did your husband leave 
the house at all except to go to the hospital for 
treatment? 
A. Not unless the children came up to see him and 
then they would take him to their house for a 
little bit, you know. Then he would lay down 
on the couch and put his leg up. 
Q. Other than those very short social visits, he 
didn't leave the house at all? 
A. No. 
Q. Was he able to walk on that leg? 
A. Limp. It hurt. 
(Deposition p. 17, L 25.) 
Q. 
A. 
The morning of the accident do you know 
whether there was anything wrong with his leg 
when he left for work that day? 
There wasn't anything wrong with it. 
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Q. What time did he come home that day? 
A. He came home 2:30 A.M. 
Q. Did he show you the leg? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he tell you about the accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Describe it. 
A. It is about 2 Y2 inches long. It looks it would be 
about between a half inch or three-quarters of 
an inch deep. Something like that. It was cut 
quite deep. 
Q. Through the skin? 
A. Yes. 
(P. 20, L 27.) 
Q. About how long after the accident did he first go 
to the hospital? 
A. We couldn't get in until the welfare gave him 
permission and ... 
(P. 20, L 27.) 
Q. And the progress of the leg between those times 
was what? Did he get better or worse or what? 
A. He kept getting worse. 
Supplementing the deposition is the Plaintiff's 
Affidavit {R-38) that deceased was unable to work, 
confined to the house, directed by the doctor to stay 
off his feet; that he was continually disabled and ill 
from termination of work until death and that the 
same condition which disabled him during that pe-
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riod was that which precluded him from continuing 
work and was the same that led to his death July 
1st. 
As against that, we have the Affidavit of Larry 
Blake (R-57) where deceased told Larry Blake "Go 
to hell," indicatinq that affiant called the doctor's 
office-obviously before deceased had seen the 
doctor-
(Deposition p. 18, L 27) 
A. He didn't see Dr. Burnham. 
Q. Did your husband try to contact him? 
A. I tried to call Dr. Burnham's office but couldn't 
get an appointment. 
Q. Couldn't get an appointment until when? 
A. She didn't say when. 
Q. Was this on what day? What day of the week? 
A. Monday morning. 
Q. Did he go to work the following day? 
A. No, Sir. 
Q. When did he next go to the plant? 
A. The following Friday ... 
(Deposition p. 19, L 20) 
Q. Is that when he got the blue slip? 
A. Yes., 
learned that decedant had not seen the doctor and 
concluded he was well. The Affidavit goes on 
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"Upon return to Ajax Press Company this Affiant 
prepared formal termination notice and to this Af-
fiant's knowledge; Leland Bench did not return to 
work after Affiant talked vrith Bench at his home." 
On the issue of total disability from termination 
until death, said Affidavit (R-57) is quite insignificant 
against the overwhelming impact of the wife's de-
lineation by Affidavit and deposition of deceased' s 
complete incapacity from termination until death. 
Regarding policy No. 0486-W, alleged in Plaint-
iff's Complaint, (R-67) and in the previous Com-
plaint (R-47) no answer has been made and we are 
at a loss to know the precise reason for dismissal 
as it relates to that certificate. 
Regarding certificate No. 0846-H, medical bene-
£its clause, the applicable responsive material in 
the answer (R-53) reads .. 
8. "That group policy No. 0486-H provides certain 
hospital and surgical benefits as scheduled there-
in, being limited however to not more than the 
actual cost incurred by the employee, and further 
provides that notice of claim shall be given to the 
Defendant within twenty days after the com-
mencement of hospital confinement or operation 
and that written proof of confinement and charges 
incurred shall be furnished within ninety days 
after the expiration of the period of hospital con-
finement or operation. 
9. That no claim has ever been made under the hos-
pital and surp-ical benefit provisions of policy No. 
0486-A and the Defendant is informed and upon 
such information and belief, alleges that the 
Plaintiff did not incur any hospital or surgical 
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expense but that in truth and in fact, 'c~c d:-
ceased was admitted to and treated as a charity 
patient at the Salt Lake County Hospital and 
therefore the Defendant has no liability to the 
Plaintiff under hospital and surgical provisions of 
policy No. 0486-A." 
We then only have the legal question presented 
whether the insurance company can take advantage 
of the deceased's entitlement to, and enjoyment of, 
treatment at the expense of the county. 
(In addition, of course, is the question of notice. 
proof and waiver of proof and estopple.) 
It is conceded, of ::::ourse, that medical benefits 
recovered would be for the benefit of the county. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it would be appropriate for this 
Court to make the following Order: 
1. Regarding the $800.00 policy No. 5311848, 
to squarely decide the legal question referred to in 
the pretrial order and in the Illinois and Oklahoma 
cases decided in the insured' s favor. 
2. Regarding the $1500.00 policy No. 0486-A 
setting the case for trial on the issues already joined 
at date of pretrial. 
3. On the weeklv benefits certificate, setting 
the case for trial on the issues of notice, Proof of 
Claim, waiver of necessity of Proof of Loss and 
estopple. 
21 
4. On the medical payments policy, squarely 
deciding the issue of whether Plaintiff is precluded 
from recovery by reason of the hospitalization hav-
ing been paid by the County and reserving for trial 
the other issues as with the weekly indemnity cer-
tificate. 
5. On all factors, allowing further discovery, 
including response to the Interrogatories {R-64); that 
Plaintiff may show the details of her allegation of 
notice, waiver of Proof of Loss and estopple. 
L'~£<--~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
~ - a~ 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
916 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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